National security is everybody’s business
John E. McLaughlin is a distinguished resident physician at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He served as Acting Director of Central Intelligence from July to September 2004 and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from October 2000 to July 2004. He was an officer in the U. S. Army in the 1960s and served in Vietnam.
OPINION — The dynamics of the war in Ukraine are evolving, with global and far-reaching consequences. The battlefield is the apparent maximum realm of change; It is now clear that Russia has learned enough from its subsequent mistakes to gain momentum and that Ukraine, which has remained without really extensive U. S. aid for six months, is in a much greater threat of defeat.
Ukraine has lowered the conscription age from 27 to 25, acknowledging a growing shortage of troops, but its most urgent desires are artillery ammunition and air defense. The most sensible U. S. commander in Europe estimates that Russia will have a 10-to-1 merit. in terms of artillery shells “in a matter of weeks. “Meanwhile, shortages of Patriots and other air defense systems in Ukraine expose major cities, including Kharkiv and Odessa, to normal attacks, adding Russian “glide bombs” that are especially difficult to intercept. Against this backdrop, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said for the first time that Ukraine could “lose the war” if U. S. aid stalls.
A Frightened Continent
Beyond the battlefield, the update is less obvious but just as impactful.
Europeans are scared, more so than they have been since the darkest days of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
In many European capitals, the question of what would happen if Russia won in Ukraine is no longer a topic of debate. Russia’s patience in that country and the disappointing final results of last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive convinced many European leaders that Putin would then head home if he is not arrested in Ukraine.
This is felt most acutely in the “frontline states”, starting with Poland, Moldova and the three Baltic states, but also in the new NATO members Sweden and Finland, and even in Germany. Polish President Andrzej Duda spoke for many when he said Russia could attack a NATO country as early as 2026 or 2027. Poland’s national security firm has publicly stated that such an attack could take place within 36 months.
This is very much in line with what I heard at the Munich Security Conference a few weeks ago. All the representatives of the frontline states spoke as if Putin’s intervention on behalf of Europe was a foregone conclusion. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas called Putin’s habit “a dictator’s playbook in genuine life,” adding that “we cannot depend on others to protect us. “
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen left the convention promising to send all Danish artillery to Ukraine, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen vowed to appoint the EU’s first defense commissioner if, as expected, he wins a second term. Von der Leyen’s aim is to adopt a new EU stance aimed at expanding and coordinating defence production and weapons interoperability in Europe.
Europe’s fears are intensified by the loss of confidence in the United States as a guarantor of security. While Europeans were inspired by President Joe Biden’s strong aid to Ukraine (56% favorable), polls conducted through the Pew Organization in 2023 showed weaknesses in the ability of Europeans. attitudes toward the United States: Only 18% believe the United States will lead the world in five years. This ambivalence is based on deep anxiety about the final results of the November presidential election; only one in six Europeans see the United States as a style of democracy, and 56% see the transatlantic alliance being weakened if Donald Trump returns to the White House. The U. S. congressional delegation’s pledges of help to the Munich convention were greeted only with uplifted eyes. and a faintly concealed disgust.
So Europe is agitated by Ukraine, fearing what Putin will and what the United States will not do.
One more Putin?
The second change from the primaries came in Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s confidence is growing.
Putin’s confidence is based on many elements, but the essential pillar lies in the collection of evidence that shows that he will be able to overcome Ukraine and its supporters. How can he feel otherwise, given the strength of the Kremlin in terms of manpower and ammunition, in contrast to divisions?in the West, faltering aid deliveries, Ukraine’s dwindling weapons stockpile and a shortage of conscripts?
Putin will also have to console himself with NATO’s preference for avoiding an escalation of the confrontation or the threat of a direct confrontation between Russia and the Western alliance. While the U. S. just used its Patriot planes and missile batteries to help protect Israel from Iranian airstrikes, Putin knows the U. S. will not directly interfere in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Putin’s Chinese partners remain solidly by his side, much of the Global South is reluctant to condemn him, and he has been greeted on trips to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. For their part, African leaders have met with Putin in St. Petersburg, and his troops have been hosted in Sahel countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, where the United States is in the background.
In short, it turns out that Putin – for now – has escaped the pariah prestige that many (myself included) predicted. It’s hard to escape the conclusion that Putin, to put it simply, feels good.
Meanwhile, Russian public opinion is either necessarily in favor of its leader or too frightened to say otherwise. I admit that I expected more resistance than we have seen, given the decency of many Russians I have met; However, many of them have left the country or lack opportunities to protest, and the majority of the Russian population, a majority, has been driven through propaganda and harsh repression to what one academic has called “academic indifference. “
Gauging Russian public opinion is a risky game, given the retaliation that many Russians fear if they make their views explicit. Even so, the independent organization Levada has managed to compile reviews that seem quite accurate and consistent with the evidence of Russian academics I spoke to outdoors. Polls conducted through Levada in 2022 and 2023 show that about 22% of Russians strongly support the war, and between 19% and 20% strongly oppose it. Those who oppose it seem reluctant to protest publicly, probably because such demonstrations take a long time. It has been sterile, due to harsh repression and sanctions such as the loss of duties or the appointment of foreign agents. Of course, the country’s most prominent dissident, Alexei Navalny, paid the highest value of all.
As for the giant organization in the middle – about 65% – a Russian journalist, now in exile, told me that these other people prefer not to think about the war and seek refuge in the constant barrage of pro-war propaganda that tells them that the West is the aggressor, determined to overburden Russia. And to the extent that the regime succeeds in making this argument, there will be a tendency, as in most countries, to unite behind “our boys. “
Meanwhile, all of Putin’s slippery justifications for the “special army operation” – such as the elimination of Ukrainian “Nazis” – have taken a back seat. Most Russians probably now see this as a just war, and now it’s just a matter of winning and losing. . Most will need to win.
Glimmers of hope?
That said, the Russians may still surprise us: Let’s not forget the ease with which the late head of the Wagner Group, Eugene Prigozhin, broke through Russian primary forces his failed uprising last June, while civilians stayed away as he marched toward But, as evidenced by Putin’s clever manipulation of the rebels and Prigozhin’s eventual demise, the possibilities for anti-war sentiment or food protests to reach critical mass and threaten Putin’s grip on politics and the state are endless.
There are two things that can undermine Putin’s confidence. First, if the U. S. and other key countries legislate long-term commitments for really broad aid to Ukraine, it would send the message that we’re in this for the long haul. Second, if the NATO summit in July provides a transparent roadmap for Ukraine’s membership, with achievable steps on this path, it would be a signal to the Kremlin that, sooner or later, Russia will clash with the alliance.
In the absence of such measures, we also lose hope that the Russians themselves will ever end Putin’s war. He will have to be defeated in the box and hard, through the Ukrainians in Ukraine. And if he is not defeated, perhaps we will soon know if the Europeans were right to be afraid.
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