A blog of the Kennan Institute
Moscow, Russia – The Tsar’s Bell rises with the Kremlin in the background.
Shutterstock. com/D. Bond
The end of 2024 brought a series of significant setbacks for Vladimir Putin: the collapse of the Assad regime, an environmental crisis in the Black Sea, the closure of the main oil pipeline to Europe, and the alienation of key Russian allies like Russia. Hungary and Slovakia. Array However, Putin’s New Year’s message remained optimistic. He looked forward to the upcoming 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Germany in World War II, ensuring the nation’s strength. He praised the Russian military for defining the homeland as it has its history and insisted that destiny remains on Russia’s side.
What is not disputed is that this New Year’s Eve marked the 25th anniversary of Putin’s rise to power. At the turn of the millennium, few in Moscow could have predicted the epochal shift that would occur when an unknown and untested figure ascended to the presidency.
In 2000, Vladimir Putin was a hard-to-understand bureaucrat with a “deer in the crosshairs” attitude, probably out of nowhere when Boris Yeltsin named him his successor. It had no national reputation, no prominent political allies, and no obviously explained constituencies. But we temporarily learned more about him. Unlike his predecessors, Putin was the first Russian leader in centuries not to be born in a village, perhaps a sign of a more urbanized and fashionable era.
We also learned about the past of Putin. Su defining Soviet experience was the defense of the KGB headquarters in Dresden and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Despite this, he was not a communist ideologue. He would later criticize Lenin for structuring the Soviet Union as a collection of national republics, a move he believed would have paved the way for its dissolution into 15 independent countries. This perspective most likely influenced Putin’s resolve not to commemorate the centenary of the Russian Revolution in 2017. In Putin’s early years, Russia actively engaged with Western institutions, joining the WTO, the European Court of Human Rights, and the new (for Russia) G8. However, Putin’s ambition to integrate Russia into the West is a relic. A true return to this trajectory will probably not be achieved without the emergence of a genuine post-Soviet generation capable of reshaping Russia’s relations with the world.
Putin declared in his New Year’s address that the foundations of Russia were solid. But everyday realities contradict this optimism. The list of economic problems – catastrophic interest rates, labor shortages, inflation, a collapsing ruble – all signal that the economic and social tensions lack easy solutions and most likely will linger even after the war ends.
In his speech, Putin emphasized the factor of sovereignty above all other foreign policy goals, but it turns out that sovereignty is just a code word for isolation. Russia touts BRICS expansion to refute accusations of monetary decline , but new members such as Ethiopia, Egypt and Iran will not trump European and US sanctions any time soon. And even China, Russia’s wife in Putin’s new multipolar global, fears facing secondary sanctions from the West because of its relations with Russia.
One looks for a glimmer of optimism in Putin’s speech, but the only word of encouragement is Putin’s declaration that everything will be fine. But hope is not a strategy. Putin says Russia continues to advance, but gives no idea in which direction. Patriotism and love of country can only take you so far. If this fails to be social for his regime, Putin’s only reaction will be to redouble repression again. Putin has already ordered the FSB to investigate spies living among the Russian people.
After a quarter century in power, Putin sees himself as a global leader. In reality, he is a foreign pariah who cannot travel to many countries due to an outstanding ICC arrest warrant for the kidnapping of youths in Ukraine.
Ironically, Putin faces many of the same demanding situations that caused the collapse of the Soviet Union: economic stagnation, a military quagmire, and growing concern about social unrest. Speaking of the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Mishustin has just announced his own five-year plan of economic progression that includes primary state infrastructure projects and the progression of the Far East and Arctic Circle. However, the 1990s and the Wild East are vague memories. Instead of foreign investment and emerging-market charm, Russia will have to face the challenge of Putin’s deprivatization (confiscation) of Western companies, without compensation. This is a challenge that will need to be addressed in the future.
After 25 years in power, Putin must, one way or another, start anew. But men in their 60s and with decades in power are intelligent agents of change. Indeed, Putin’s New Year’s speech suggests that a new era of stagnation awaits Russia. , peppered with platitudes about an excellent afterlife and devoid of any genuine basis for optimism or customers for opportunity.
In fact, when I lived in Moscow at the dawn of the new millennium, I met many young professionals—lawyers, businessmen, journalists, monetary experts—who were betting that Russia might simply change. This bet was lost.
So what awaits us in Putin’s twenty-sixth year in power? Various expenditures and policy recommendations are circulating through the Kremlin, ranging from worst to worse, even contradictory. To deal with Russia’s chronic demographic crisis, Putin told Federation Council head Valentina Matvienko to increase the birth rate to 10 young people per woman. There is also a bill according to which, for the sake of sovereignty, Russia bans words of foreign origin from its vocabulary. Foreign music is also in the Duma’s sights.
Putin has a cool head. Their annual marathon lasted four hours. A feat of permanence and abundant memory for a man of his age. However, his New Year’s message does not inspire the same confidence. After 25 years in power, Putin is running out of ideas.
The perspectives expressed in this article are unique and do not reflect those of the Kennan Institute.