Shortly before Christmas I bought a new Brompton G Line electric bike, a new-taste device very sensitive to diversity from one of the wonderful pioneers of folding motorcycle technology. He had ordered it in late summer and it was delivered about two months later than originally scheduled. This is not Brompton’s fault, far from it.
The motorcycle is powered by an electric motor of original design and controls, created by the company itself. Production was outsourced (and materials were disrupted this autumn due to the Ministry of Defence’s urgent need for parts for new military drones), as chief executive Will Butler-Adams told the BBC this weekend.
This is a curious insight into the “grey zone” development with drones, which are now targeting important infrastructure and security assets of the UK and its allies. This is a prime example of one of the new “hybrid wars” now being waged by Russia and its opposing supporters against a variety of NATO allies, i. e. those who actively support Ukraine.
The first warnings about possible hostile drone surveillance came from Norwegian military and intelligence facilities about three years ago. They warned of a wave of drone activity over North Sea oil fields and terminals, as well as undersea communication cables. The Norwegians believed that drones were introduced from merchant ships sailing towards the Kremlin’s security facilities.
Since then, drones have been operating over sensitive sites in the North Sea and airfields across northern Europe, the UK added. Late last year, swarms of drones were observed off the east coast of the United States, once scanning ports and marine terminals.
Days after the United States and the United Kingdom last November forced Ukraine to use its deep strike weapons, such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles, to attack targets in Russia, drones were active over British and American bases in Britain and Germany.
The drones appeared at dusk in late November over bases at Lakenheath and Mildenhall in Suffolk and Feltwell in Norfolk. They were small, but military grade, according to one analyst. The use of the cloak of darkness recommended the army make plans and intentions. Last month, they were spotted at Ramstain, the US military center in Germany.
The drones will most likely be used as a component of the “hybrid” offensive, which includes surveillance and sabotage of underwater cables and power pipelines, which would be orchestrated through the Main Directorate of Underwater Research. armed forces, known as GUGI, a secret unit of the Russian army. Navy. GUGI deploys frogman commando groups, manned and unmanned submarines, and a flotilla of tugboats, disguised trawlers, and reconnaissance vessels.
Three tankers and freighters are suspected of ripping pipelines and communication cables in the past 18 months, the Newnew Polar Bear in 2023, and the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 and Cook Islands registered Eagle S last year. The Eagle S was arrested by Finland’s coastguard, accused on cutting the main Estlink 2 cable under the Gulf of Finland connecting with Estonia.
The use of drones, whether for just or unjust purposes, has grown enormously. They play a decisive role in the open war in the Middle East, in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and from 2022 in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin recently boasted that Russia would have produced 140,000 drones of all types by 2023. In the first nine months of last year, 5,600 examples of the Iranian-designed Shahed 136 were built at a custom-built factory in Alabuga, Tatarstan, east from Moscow. The factory is believed to be decorated with extensive paintings of African teenagers and young women.
Ukraine is expected to produce more drones this year than the entire NATO alliance combined. It is engaged in a desperate arms race to stay ahead of the enemy in terms of generation and tactics. The key elements are the use of small private drones, or FPV and cheap, unarmed decoy drones. Last year, Russia produced 10,000 discounted Gerbera drones, which carry nuclear warheads but are designed to “usurp” or lie to air defense by wasting ammunition and effort.
Drones have turned classic frontline fighting tactics on their heads. This means that almost any and all out-of-position movements, whether protecting or attacking, can be detected and countered within minutes. The drone makes the battlefield transparent. And that requires a revolutionary technique on how to fight, defend and win on the ground.
Drones also require a very different approach to homeland security and resilience, the protection of our civil communities and their vital support systems. This is not to say drones are all bad, or the Frankenstein’s killer robots of the future now upon us. They can be fun – the Army has just introduced drone racing to their sports schedules – and lifesavers. Heavy lift drones are used increasingly in mountain and offshore rescue, and lifting vital blood and vital medical supplies across difficult terrain.
The hostile use of drones, frequently, surreptitiously and in gigantic numbers – as demonstrated by the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea – is a prime example of the “grey rhino” risk, a vast and apparent risk too ignored by those who deserve to be informed. Gray rhinos are accomplices of black swans in the collection of metaphorical risk animals.
The drone menace is a prime element in the hybrid war tactics now being practiced across dozens of conflicts. They are the Grey Rhinos of our time. None of us can afford to let this phenomenon to be promoted to the status of an even more dangerous animal in the threat menagerie – the Black Jellyfish, the creeping, insidious threat that most try to ignore altogether.
Robert Fox is defense editor
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