Read The Diplomat, get to know Asia-Pacific
Global relations – and China-EU relations in particular – are very different from what they were in 2024.
From left to right: French President Emmanuel Macron, Chinese President Xi Jinping and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Beijing, China, April 6, 2023.
From May 5 to 10, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay state visits to France, Serbia and Hungary, the first to Europe since the start of the pandemic. The global has changed a lot since 2019, when Xi was last in Europe, and Europe’s strategy towards China is no exception.
Tellingly, one of the historic achievements of Xi’s latest tour of several European countries has collapsed. In March 2019, Xi visited Italy and Rome officially signed the Belt and Road Initiative, becoming the first G7 member country to do so. At the end of 2023, the Italian government withdrew from the BIS, claiming that the initiative had delivered the promised benefits.
Italy’s open break with the BIS is part of a series of setbacks in Sino-European relations. COVID-19 — and China’s clumsy handling of international relations in that period, which included condescending insults to European countries for their handling of the pandemic — actually did it Beijing doesn’t do any favors. More broadly, however, sentiments toward China have deteriorated amid heightened geopolitical and economic competition.
In December 2020, for example, China and Europe reached an agreement in principle on a bilateral investment agreement. However, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, as it was officially called, never entered into force. Less than six months after its completion, the European Parliament voted to freeze the ratification process, penalizing China for applying sanctions to MEPs who had spoken out against China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
Tensions between China and Europe in the economic realm (which were once the glue that helped bind ties together) have only deepened since then. The European Commission is opening a series of industrial investigations that could lead to sanctions on Chinese exports of clean technologies.
But the biggest culprit in the erosion of China-Europe relations – which necessarily accelerates a process of scepticism towards China that is already emerging in European capitals – is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
China has been clear and transparent in saying that it is impartial in the ongoing conflict. As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said at his press briefing on Monday: “China is not one of the creators of the Ukraine crisis or a component of it. “I’ve never done anything to fan the flames or try to profit from the crisis. “
Despite those protests, common high-level diplomatic exchanges between China and Russia make clear where Beijing’s sympathies lie. China has also been quick to fill the gaps by exiting Western corporations from the Russian market, either by loading Russian power or exporting dual-use goods. goods to Russia.
U. S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken just wrapped up a visit to China, where he made clear that China’s continued willingness to provide Russia with generation for military use is a major topic of discussion. We can expect Ukraine to feature prominently in Xi’s discussions in Europe as well, especially in France.
While China is reluctant to include explicit issues on the agenda, France itself made it clear that “exchanges will focus on external crises, first and foremost the war in Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East”, as well as on “trade, clinical and issues” issues, cultural and sports cooperation” and “the weather emergency”.
French President Emmanuel Macron has said he will do “everything possible” to secure an Olympic truce at the upcoming Paris Olympics this summer, and that he will ask Xi for help in making it a reality.
A high-level peace convention on the Russia-Ukraine war will be held in Switzerland in mid-June. Macron possibly hopes to entice Beijing to participate in the meeting, hoping to make genuine progress. China has reportedly been invited, but remains coy about whether or not it will participate.
During a stopover in Beijing earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reported that China had agreed with Russia that any peace convention that does not reflect Moscow’s position is “useless. “China’s most sensible diplomat, Wang Yi, softened the proposal, but expressed a preference for peace talks “in which all parties can participate similarly and talk about all peace responses equally. “
The visit to France will most likely involve complicated discussions about the many serious issues plaguing China-EU relations. Xi follows up with two soft attacks on Serbia and Hungary, described as the “remnants of ‘China loyalists’ in the region” in a recent investigation by researchers from the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) project.
Compare the language used to anticipate Xi’s trips to each of the countries: Lin, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, noted that France and China have “effective strategic communication and fruitful practical cooperation. “On the other hand, Lin boasted of China’s “ironclad friendship. “” with Serbia, saying: “The two countries are firmly united on issues of core interests and primary concerns, and enjoy strong political mutual trust. Hungary is in the middle, with “deep political mutual trust. “
It should also be noted that Xi will be in Serbia on May 7, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the NATO airstrike that hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the bombing of the former Yugoslavia. We can expect a commemoration of the tragedy, marked through a sure vitriol against the United States and its allies.
While Serbia and Hungary are highly likely to be rewarded with investments and other deals, few expect genuine progress with Xi’s presence in France. At most, China would possibly expect a repeat of Macron’s high-profile proclamation of strategic autonomy, necessarily reserving the right to break with the United States over China policy. But much of the turmoil in Sino-European relations now stems from local anxieties within European countries and, more damning for Beijing, from European trade leaders.
Further complicating Xi’s relationship with Europe is that he is expected to host Russian President Vladimir Putin shortly after his return to Beijing. Although China has not yet officially unveiled the plan, Putin himself has announced that he will take a stand sometime in May. The hosts in Europe are well aware that the “limitless” friendship between China and Russia is about to manifest itself just weeks after their own meetings with the Chinese leader.
Understand Asia-Pacific’s biggest issues with a subscription to The Diplomat.
From May 5 to 10, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay state visits to France, Serbia and Hungary, the first to Europe since the start of the pandemic. The global has changed a lot since 2019, when Xi was last in Europe, and Europe’s strategy towards China is no exception.
Tellingly, one of the historic achievements of Xi’s latest tour of several European countries has collapsed. In March 2019, Xi visited Italy and Rome officially signed the Belt and Road Initiative, becoming the first G7 member country to do so. At the end of 2023, the Italian government withdrew from the BIS, claiming that the initiative had delivered the promised benefits.
Italy’s open break with the BIS is part of a series of setbacks in Sino-European relations. COVID-19 — and China’s clumsy handling of international relations in that period, which included condescending insults to European countries for their handling of the pandemic — actually did it Beijing doesn’t do any favors. More broadly, however, sentiments toward China have deteriorated amid heightened geopolitical and economic competition.
In December 2020, for example, China and Europe reached an agreement in principle on a bilateral investment agreement. However, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, as it was officially called, never entered into force. Less than six months after its completion, the European Parliament voted to freeze the ratification process, penalizing China for applying sanctions to MEPs who had spoken out against China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
Tensions between China and Europe in the economic realm (which were once the glue that helped bind ties together) have only deepened since then. The European Commission is opening a series of industrial investigations that could lead to sanctions on Chinese exports of clean technologies.
But the biggest culprit in the erosion of China-Europe relations – which necessarily accelerates a process of scepticism towards China that is already emerging in European capitals – is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
China has been clear and transparent in saying that it is impartial in the ongoing conflict. As Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said at his press briefing on Monday: “China is not one of the creators of the Ukraine crisis or a component of it. “I’ve never done anything to fan the flames or try to profit from the crisis. “
Despite those protests, common high-level diplomatic exchanges between China and Russia make clear where Beijing’s sympathies lie. China has also been quick to fill the gaps by exiting Western corporations from the Russian market, either by loading Russian power or exporting dual-use goods. goods to Russia.
U. S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken just made a stopover in China, where he made clear that China’s continued preference for supplying Russia with technology for military use is a major topic of discussion. We can expect Ukraine to feature prominently in Xi’s discussions in Europe as well, especially in France.
While China is reluctant to include explicit issues on the agenda, France itself made it clear that “exchanges will focus on external crises, first and foremost the war in Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East”, as well as on “trade, clinical and issues” issues, cultural and sports cooperation” and “the weather emergency”.
French President Emmanuel Macron has said he will do “everything possible” to secure an Olympic truce at the upcoming Paris Olympics this summer, and that he will ask Xi for help in making it a reality.
A high-level peace convention on the Russia-Ukraine war will be held in Switzerland in mid-June. Macron possibly hopes to entice Beijing to participate in the meeting, hoping to make genuine progress. China has reportedly been invited, but remains coy about whether or not it will participate.
During a stopover in Beijing earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reported that China had agreed with Russia that any peace convention that does not reflect Moscow’s position is “useless. “China’s most sensible diplomat, Wang Yi, softened the proposal, but expressed a preference for peace talks “in which all parties can participate similarly and talk about all peace responses equally. “
The visit to France will most likely involve complicated discussions about the many serious issues plaguing China-EU relations. Xi follows up with two soft attacks on Serbia and Hungary, described as the “remnants of ‘China loyalists’ in the region” in a recent investigation by researchers from the China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) project.
Compare the language used to anticipate Xi’s trips to each of the countries: Lin, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, noted that France and China have “effective strategic communication and fruitful practical cooperation. “On the other hand, Lin boasted of China’s “ironclad friendship. “” with Serbia, saying: “The two countries are firmly united on issues of core interests and primary concerns, and enjoy strong political mutual trust. Hungary is in the middle, with “deep political mutual trust. “
It should also be noted that Xi will be in Serbia on May 7, coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the NATO airstrike that hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the bombing of the former Yugoslavia. We can expect a commemoration of the tragedy, marked through a sure vitriol against the United States and its allies.
While Serbia and Hungary are highly likely to be rewarded with investments and other deals, few expect genuine progress with Xi’s presence in France. At most, China would possibly expect a repeat of Macron’s high-profile proclamation of strategic autonomy, necessarily reserving the right to break with the United States over China policy. But much of the turmoil in Sino-European relations now stems from local anxieties within European countries and, more damning for Beijing, from European trade leaders.
Further complicating Xi’s relationship with Europe is that he is expected to host Russian President Vladimir Putin shortly after his return to Beijing. Although China has not yet officially unveiled the plan, Putin himself has announced that he will take a stand sometime in May. The hosts in Europe are well aware that the “limitless” friendship between China and Russia is about to manifest itself just weeks after their own meetings with the Chinese leader.
From May 5 to 10, Chinese President Xi Jinping will pay state visits to France, Serbia and Hungary, the first to Europe since the start of the pandemic. The global has changed a lot since 2019, when Xi was last in Europe, and Europe’s strategy towards China is no exception.
Tellingly, one of the historic achievements of Xi’s latest tour of several European countries has collapsed. In March 2019, Xi visited Italy and Rome officially signed the Belt and Road Initiative, becoming the first G7 member country to do so. At the end of 2023, the Italian government withdrew from the BIS, claiming that the initiative had delivered the promised benefits.
Shannon Tiezzi is the editor-in-chief of The Diplomat.